Tennis is a Part of My Life free essay sample

The sound of opening brand new tennis balls fills my ears with a powerful pssht. Today is another game day, this time we – the girls’ tennis team are up against our rivals from Oak Ridge. I am playing a doubles game with a powerful teammate who can hit fast, deep serves. And yet, it’s me who is serving to the opponent. About two feet from the middle of the baseline, I bounce the fresh neon-yellow ball three times before tossing it up into the air. As the ball reaches its apex and starts to descend, my arm arcs up to slice serve it over the lofty net. The ball kicks off the ground away from my opponents and right smack into one of the holes of the fence. Fifteen love. Once I’m on the left of my partner, I smacked a serve that looked like an absolute value graph. We will write a custom essay sample on Tennis is a Part of My Life or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page But learning from my previous serve, my opponent had her guard up so she had an amazing on-the-rise cross-court return, with me persistently rallying with her until I had the chance to use my topspin lob. Seeing that it had risen to the height of two tennis courts on top, my opponents is confident that it will be out until it slowly falls down and softly thumps up and down vertically on the green asphalt court. Astonished to see that I had successfully made it in, both my partner and opponents congratulated me with utmost praise and respect. After an hour and a half-hour, we finally ended the match with a score of 6-4, 3-6, tiebreaker 10-7.

On Virtue and Happiness, by John Stuart Mill

On Virtue and Happiness, by John Stuart Mill English philosopher and social reformer John Stuart Mill was one of the major intellectual figures of the 19th century and a founding member of the Utilitarian Society. In the following excerpt from his long philosophical essay Utilitarianism, Mill relies on strategies of classification and division to defend the utilitarian doctrine that happiness is the sole end of human action. On Virtue and Happiness by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) The utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end. What ought to be required of this doctrine,what conditions is it requisite that the doctrine should fulfill, to make good its claim to be believed? The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good, that each persons happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its t itle as one of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality. But it has not, by this alone, proved itself to be the sole criterion. To do that, it would seem, by the same rule, necessary to show, not only that people desire happiness, but that they never desire anything else. Now it is palpable that they do desire things which, in common language, are decidedly distinguished from happiness. They desire, for example, virtue, and the absence of vice, no less really than pleasure and the absence of pain. The desire of virtue is not as universal, but it is as authentic a fact, as the desire of happiness. And hence the opponents of the utilitarian standard deem that they have a right to infer that there are other ends of human action besides happiness, and that happiness is not the standard of approbation and disapprobation. But does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people desire virtue, or maintain that virtue is not a thing to be desired? The very reverse. It maintains not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be desired disinterestedly, for itself. Whatever may be the opinion of utilitarian moralists as to the original conditions by which virtue is made virtue, however they may believe (as they do) that actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue, yet this being granted, and it having been decided, from considerations of this description, what is virtuous, they not only place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means to the ultimate end, but they also recognize as a psychological fact the possibility of its being, to the individual, a good in itself, without looking to any end beyond it; and hold, that the mind is not in a right state, not in a state conformable to Utility, not in the state most conducive to the general h appiness, unless it does love virtue in this manner- as a thing desirable in itself, even although, in the individual instance, it should not produce those other desirable consequences which it tends to produce, and on account of which it is held to be virtue. This opinion is not, in the smallest degree, a departure from the Happiness principle. The ingredients of happiness are very various, and each of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as swelling an aggregate. The principle of utility does not mean that any given pleasure, as music, for instance, or any given exemption from pain, as for example health, is to be looked upon as means to a collective something termed happiness, and to be desired on that account. They are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides being means, they are a part of the end. Virtue, according to the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end, but it is capable of becoming so; and in those who love it disinterestedly it has become so, and is desired and cherished, not as a means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness. Concluded on page two Continued from page oneTo illustrate this farther, we may remember that virtue is not the only thing, originally a means, and which if it were not a means to anything else, would be and remain indifferent, but which by association with what it is a means to, comes to be desired for itself, and that too with the utmost intensity. What, for example, shall we say of the love of money? There is nothing originally more desirable about money than about any heap of glittering pebbles. Its worth is solely that of the things which it will buy; the desires for other things than itself, which it is a means of gratifying. Yet the love of money is not only one of the strongest moving forces of human life, but money is, in many cases, desired in and for itself; the desire to possess it is often stronger than the desire to use it, and goes on increasing when all the desires which point to ends beyond it, to be compassed by it, are falling off. It may, then, be said truly, that money is desired not for the sake of an end, but as part of the end. From being a means to happiness, it has come to be itself a principal ingredient of the individuals conception of happiness. The same may be said of the majority of the great objects of human life:power, for example, or fame; except that to each of these there is a certain amount of immediate pleasure annexed, which has at least the semblance of being naturally inherent in them- a thing which cannot be said of money. Still, however, the strongest natural attraction, both of power and of fame, is the immense aid they give to the attainment of our other wishes; and it is the strong association thus generated between them and all our objects of desire, which gives to the direct desire of them the intensity it often assumes, so as in some characters to surpass in strength all other desires. In these cases the means have become a part of the end, and a more important part of it than any of the things which they are means to. What was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of ha ppiness, has come to be desired for its own sake. In being desired for its own sake it is, however, desired as part of happiness. The person is made, or thinks he would be made, happy by its mere possession; and is made unhappy by failure to obtain it. The desire of it is not a different thing from the desire of happiness, any more than the love of music, or the desire of health. They are included in happiness. They are some of the elements of which the desire of happiness is made up. Happiness is not an abstract idea, but a concrete whole; and these are some of its parts. And the utilitarian standard sanctions and approves their being so. Life would be a poor thing, very ill provided with sources of happiness, if there were not this provision of nature, by which things originally indifferent, but conducive to, or otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive desires, become in themselves sources of pleasure more valuable than the primitive pleasures, both in permanency, in the space of human existence that they are capable of covering, and even in intensity. Virtue, according to the utilitarian conception, is a good of this description. There was no original desire of it, or motive to it, save its conduciveness to pleasure, and especially to protection from pain. But through the association thus formed, it may be felt a good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as any other good; and with this difference between it and the love of money, of power, or of fame- that all of these may, and often do, render the individual noxious to the other members of the society to which he belongs, whereas there is nothing which makes him so much a blessing to them as the cultivation of the disinterested love of virtue. And consequently, the utilitarian standard, while it tolerates and approves those other acquired desires, up to the point beyond which they would be more injurious to the general happiness than promotive of it, enjoins and requires the cultivation of the love of virtue up to the greatest strength possible, as being above all things important to the general happiness. It results from the preceding considerations, that there is in reality nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not desired for itself until it has become so. Those who desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for both reasons united; as in truth the pleasure and pain seldom exist separately, but almost always together- the same person feeling pleasure in the degree of virtue attained, and pain in not having attained more. If one of these gave him no pleasure, and the other no pain, he would not love or desire virtue, or would desire it only for the other benefits which it might produce to himself or to persons whom he cared for. We have now, then, an answer to the question, of what sort of proof the principle of utility is susceptible. If the opinion which I have now stated is psychologically true- if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness, we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only things desirable. If so, happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct; from whence it necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included in the whole. (1863)

Law & Criminology Case Study Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 4500 words

Law & Criminology - Case Study Example While the employers' range of freedom has been curtailed to some degree, they can benefit from proper documentation, following procedures which have now become quite strictly defined, and ensuring that they enforce the terms of the Employment Contracts in an evenhanded way. In either a criminal or a civil case, an employee has certain rights which are assured by law under ACAS or under the PACE laws of 1984, and as amended and clarified by subsequent court cases. A disciplinary process allows similar rules of interview, recording and evidence as required under PACE. Few employer actions against employees result in criminal proceedings; of those that do, the due processes outlined in the following pages are relatively the same. A potential criminal prosecution can be followed by an interview, but rules of evidence are required. As outlined in PACE (1984) 67(9), an individual representing a company or a government body can have the same rights and obligations as a police inspector. The obligations include informing the interviewee that his/her declarations can be used in a subsequent prosecution, that the interview minutes be noted in writing and shared with the interviewee, and that certain rules pertaining to recording (if present) are applicable. In the case of an interview for disciplinary purposes, there is also a procedure outlined by the Department of Labor that requires a set series of written documentation. This process refers to the Employment Contract, and to the Employment Policies of the employer, which must be given to the employee within 60 days of the commencement of his or her employment. The elements that must be put in the Employment Contract have grown over the past twenty years, as has the unenforceability of some of the clauses which had existed in Employment Contracts written at an earlier period. Employers should be particularly chary about imposing changes (real or implied) in the work contract without the explicit, and usually written, consent of those employed. Failure to garner the employees' agreement can result in a rupture of contract and a cause for action against the employer in the future. This paper will outline the procedures in both cases, and the differences. It will also present a way to decide which process should be pursued, i.e. whether an employee should be treated as a potential defendant in a criminal case, or whether the employer intends to keep the person in his/her employ, but would like to address certain deficiencies through a disciplinary process. The Disciplinary Process Employees who are not meeting the terms of their Employment Contract can be subject to disciplinary hearings. It should be noted that, by the time the formal procedure is followed, there may have been some previous conversations between the employee and his/her supervisor. The substance of these conversations should be noted by the supervisor, as these notes may become part of a subsequent disciplinary process. Although a conversation between the employ